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Abstract 
Before 2001, Australian companies reported abnormal items on the face of the income 
statement or by way of note. In response to perceived abuses in classifying items as 
abnormal, AASB 1018 was reissued in October 1999 with the reference to abnormal items 
removed. We analyse the implications of the changes to accounting standard requirements 
relating to abnormal items, and examine whether there is empirical evidence of opportunistic 
classification of operating profit items as abnormal. Our results suggest that some companies 
may have opportunistically classified large expense items as “abnormal” to boost their 
reported “normal” earnings number.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
How components of profit should be classified and displayed in financial reports has been the 
subject of much debate and has been given considerable attention by accounting standard-
setters. The debate has centred on distinguishing profit from ordinary operations and profit 
arising from events outside the ordinary operations of the business, identifying which 
components of profit from ordinary operations should be disclosed separately, and the form 
those disclosures should take.  
 
Over time, Australian accounting standards have changed in their requirements for 
distinguishing between extraordinary items and operating profit, and for separate disclosure of 
certain components of operating profit. Until 1989, Australian companies frequently reported 
extraordinary items, distinguishing them from profit from ordinary operations. Perceptions of 
companies opportunistically classifying income and expense items as extraordinary led to the 
standard-setters tightening the definition to the extent that items would meet the definition 
only in very rare cases. In examining reporting practices before and after this change, 
Houghton (1994) observed a significant increase in the frequency of profit and loss (P&L) 
items being classified as “abnormal items” after 1989, and found that they were, on average, 
losses, whereas they were previously, on average, gains. Classification of P&L items as 
abnormal attracted the attention of regulators and the media in the late 1990s, and concerns 
were raised that items that should have been classified as part of profit from normal 
operations were being classified as abnormal to improve reported “normal” earnings (see 
McLean 1999). When the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) proposed to 
remove the abnormal items classification from accounting standards, some respondents to 
the exposure draft supported the move, while others argued that it inhibited companies’ ability 
to indicate the underlying transitory nature of some items. Revisions to accounting standards 
nevertheless proceeded and, from 2001, Australian companies were no longer permitted to 
classify P&L items as abnormal.   
 
The controversy surrounding the perceived abuses of classifying P&L items as abnormal, and 
the opposition to removal of the abnormal classification from accounting standards, raises the 
question of whether the change was justified. This paper addresses this question by 
examining whether there was an increase in the frequency and magnitude of abnormal items 
over the seven-year period up to the removal of the “abnormal” classification from accounting 
standards.  
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DISTINGUISHING OPERATING PROFIT AND PROFIT OUTSIDE ORDINARY 
OPERATIONS 
 
 
Reporting the results of operations is viewed as one of the most important aspects of financial 
reporting (Williams 1998). The manner in which information is disclosed in the financial 
statements is said to enhance users’ ability to make predictions about companies’ future 
prospects. A company’s activities may differ in stability, risk and the predicability of financial 
performance. Hence, the separate disclosure of earnings components facilitates 
understanding of the company’s underlying performance in the financial reporting period and 
assists financial statement users in determining the extent to which past results can be useful 
in assessing a company’s future results. For instance, the income statement’s predictive 
value is enhanced if unusual, abnormal or infrequent items of income and expense are 
separately disclosed (Rapaccioli and Schiff 1993). 
 
Accounting standards require companies to disaggregate net income into specific 
components. Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) allow management to use 
discretion in determining how certain items are classified and reported in the financial 
statements. Classification affects where an item is placed in the financial statements and 
hence can result in more detailed disclosure of an item by means of its placement. For 
example, if management wishes to draw attention to a particular transaction, classifying an 
item as unusual, special, significant, abnormal or extraordinary may achieve this objective. On 
the other hand, if management wants to mask a transaction (Bernard and Schipper 1994), 
then the classification of such an item in ordinary earnings may achieve this purpose.  
 
US research provides empirical evidence of companies opportunistically classifying P&L 
items as “special items”1 (see, for example, Elliot and Shaw 1998, Bartov 1993, Francis et al 
1996, Moerle 2002, McVay 2006). McVay (2006) finds that companies opportunistically shift 
expenses from “core” earnings to special items to boost reported core earnings. As special 
items are generally viewed as transitory in nature, both managers and analysts tend to 
exclude them from core earnings. McVay finds that, on average, reported special items are in 
fact current-period operating expenses that are not transitory and therefore were 
opportunistically classified as special. Special items are similar to abnormal items and may 
similarly be viewed as transitory in nature.  
 
 
THE RISE OF ABNORMAL ITEMS  
 
 
In Australia, the first accounting standard relating to reporting operating profit was AAS 1 
Profit and Loss Statements,2 which was initially issued in December 1973. AAS 1 
distinguished between operating profit, abnormal items and extraordinary, defining abnormal 
items as “items of revenue and expense, and other gains and losses, brought into account in 
the period, which although attributable to the ordinary operations of the business entity are 
considered abnormal by reason of their size and effect on the results for the period” (para. 4 
(c)). 
 
Extraordinary items were defined at that time in AAS 1 as “items of revenue and expense, 
and other gains and losses, brought to account in the period, which are attributable to events 
or transactions outside the ordinary operations of the business entity” (para. 4 (d)). 
 
Thus, the distinguishing feature between extraordinary items and abnormal items was 
whether they arose from the ordinary operations of the business; extraordinary items originate 
outside ordinary operations, whereas abnormal items emanate from ordinary operations, but, 
because of their size and effect on income, warrant separate disclosure.  
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When AAS 1 was first issued, abnormal items were considered by some to be “merely 
highlighted components of operating profit” (Jukes 1988, p. 85).  Abnormal items were 
perceived as being used to manage users’ perceptions of operating performance by bringing 
the reader’s attention to the “existence of large debits or credits included in profit for the year 
which were from operations” (Jukes 1988, p. 85). 
 
The extraordinary item classification was generally viewed as being too subjective (Jukes 
1988) and Australian standard-setters moved to tighten the definition. In November 1989, the 
(then named) Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) reissued AAS 1 in conjunction 
with the issue of ASRB 1018 Profit and Loss Accounts,3 effective from 31 December 1989. 
Extraordinary items were redefined as “items of revenue and expense which are attributable 
to events or transactions of a type that are outside the ordinary operations of the company or 
group of companies and are not of a recurring nature” (ASRB 1018, para. 6). This change 
brought the Australian definition of extraordinary items in line with the definition used in 
overseas standards.4 The change meant that for an item to be reported as extraordinary it 
must be both outside the ordinary operations of the business and non-recurring. The more 
stringent definition of extraordinary items meant that many items that were previously 
reported as extraordinary would no longer qualify for that classification and would have to be 
included as abnormal items (or otherwise) as part of the all-important operating profit number 
(Parry 1990). 
 
Subsequent to the 1989 change to the definition of extraordinary items, many companies 
began to highlight profit before abnormal items when releasing results. The standard gave 
companies the option of disclosing abnormal items on the face of the income statement or in 
the notes to the financial statements. Abnormal items and “operating profit before abnormal 
items” were typically presented as separate line items on the income statement. Company 
press releases announcing profit results also commonly focused on profit before abnormal 
items, rather than net operating profit. For many financial statement users, particularly 
journalists and financial analysts, earnings before abnormal items became a key measure of 
performance, at the expense of performance indicators disclosed in the profit and loss 
statement (Parker and Porter 2000). 
 
Houghton (1994) studied changes in the reporting of extraordinary and abnormal items by 91 
of Australia’s largest companies from 1988 to 1991, representing two years before, and two 
years after, the changes to the accounting standard. Houghton found that, on average, 
extraordinary items reported in 1988 and 1989 were losses, while during the same period, 
abnormal items were, on average, gains. However, after the definitional change to 
extraordinary items, the number of reported extraordinary items declined by approximately 
half. In contrast, the number of reported abnormal items doubled after 1989. Houghton’s 
evidence suggests that the change in definition made extraordinary items a rarer event and 
concurrently the reporting of abnormal items became more frequent.  
 
Interestingly, the nature of reported abnormal items also fundamentally changed after the 
change to the definition of extraordinary items. Before the change, abnormal items were, on 
average, consistently gains, whereas after the change abnormal items were, like 
extraordinary items, on average large losses. Houghton’s analysis suggests that with the 
tightening of the definition of extraordinary items and the consequent limited opportunities to 
shift expenses away from operating profit, companies started to use the abnormal 
classification to shift expenses from “normal” operating profit.5 
 
 
THE DEMISE OF ABNORMAL ITEMS  
 
 
In the late 1990s, the reporting of abnormal items drew much criticism, particularly because of 
the perception that “there is no such thing as abnormal profits, only abnormal losses” (Parker 
and Porter 2000, p. 66) and that companies were using abnormal items to improve their 
reported earnings before abnormal items (McLean 1999, Saunders 1999). Abnormal item 
reporting practices also came under the scrutiny of regulators. In its 1999 financial reporting 
surveillance program, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
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expressed concern that companies were classifying items as abnormal so as to report an 
improved earnings before abnormal items result (McCahey 1999). Specific concerns identified 
by ASIC were: 
 
• many companies provided insufficient information for financial statement users to be able 
to determine the nature of items reported as abnormal; 
• expenses were classified as abnormal even though they were part of the normal 
operating activities of a company and that they were of a similar size from year to year; 
and 
• mining exploration companies were disclosing all write-offs of exploration expenditure as 
abnormal (McCahey 1999, p. 72). 
 
These criticisms suggest that companies were opportunistically classifying items as 
“abnormal” to influence users’ perceptions about their earnings.  
 
In July 1998, the Australian Accounting Research Foundation (AARF) issued Exposure Draft 
93 Statement of Financial Performance and Ancillary Amendments as part of the program to 
achieve greater harmony between Australian accounting standards and those of the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). The preface to ED 93 (p. 6) states that 
as the relevant international standard6 does not use the term “abnormal items” or a substitute 
term, it was proposed to delete the AASB 1018 requirements relating to abnormal items and 
instead adopt the international requirement to disclose separately “items of revenue and 
expense within the profit or loss or result from ordinary activities where their size, nature or 
incidence is relevant in explaining the performance of the entity”.   
 
This proposal to eliminate the use of the term “abnormal items” in financial reports met a 
mixed response from constituents. Of the 27 written submissions on ED 93 received by the 
AARF, 24 commented specifically on the proposed amendments to abnormal items. Five 
submissions supported the proposed amendments, ten supported them but with caveats, and 
the remaining nine basically argued for the disclosure of abnormal items to continue.  Two of 
the other respondents criticised the proposals as introducing even more technicalities which 
might obscure the information being conveyed in the financial reports, which would “mislead 
rather than enlighten users”, and noted that ED 93 had not covered the presentation of 
“maintainable earnings”.  
 
AASB 1018 was reissued in October 1999 (effective 2001) as the Statement of Financial 
Performance with the term “abnormal items” removed. Instead, AASB 1018, para. 5.4, stated: 
“When a revenue or an expense from ordinary activities is of such a size, nature or incidence 
that its disclosure is relevant in explaining the financial performance of the entity for the 
reporting period and its disclosure is not otherwise required by this or another Standard, its 
nature and amount must be disclosed separately either on the face of the statement of 
financial performance or in the notes in the financial report.” 
 
Accordingly, under the revised AASB 1018, reporting results before and after abnormal items 
was no longer permitted.7 However, as there was no explicit prohibition of the term “abnormal 
item”, some companies continued to use the term when reporting their results to the market.8 
To check compliance with AASB 1018, ASIC reviewed the financial statements to 30 June 
2001 of 80 listed companies. Sub-standard practices uncovered by ASIC included companies 
highlighting abnormal items. ASIC Chief Accountant Ian Mackintosh commented: “Some 
companies could not kick the abnormal habit and singled out ‘abnormal’ or ‘unusual’ items in 
the Statement of Financial Performance itself” (Mackintosh 2002, p. 49). Observations of 
companies continuing to label items as abnormal or significant in financial reports were also 
identified in the financial press. Examples include: “Companies have allocated abnormals 
exactly as they used to, but have substituted new names” (Wilson 2002, p. 24); and: “Until 
2000, asset writedowns could be reported separately, as abnormal items. They are now 
called ‘significant items’” (Dunn 2002, p. 34).9  
 
AASB 1018 was further revised in (and operative from) June 2002, and clarified the 
prohibition on companies from presenting sub-totals of profits or losses that referred to profit 
or loss before additional disclosures in explaining profit performance. However, the continued 
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practice of disclosing material items of revenue and expense as “abnormal”, “significant” or 
“unusual”10 raises the issue of whether the standard-setters were justified in removing the 
“abnormal” classification from the accounting standard.  
 
 
CHANGES IN THE FREQUENCY AND MAGNITUDE OF P&L ITEMS CLASSIFIED AS 
ABNORMAL  
 
 
This study explores whether the shift in nature and the increase in the reporting of abnormal 
items in the early 1990s, as documented by Houghton (1994), continued until the term 
“abnormal items” was removed from accounting standards (effective from 2001). We examine 
the trends over time to identify whether the frequency of reported abnormal items increased, 
whether the magnitude of reported abnormal items changed, and whether there is symmetry 
in reporting of abnormal gains and losses.  
 
The study period starts in 1994 and extends to 2000, the last year in which abnormal items 
were required by AASB 1018 to be reported . The year 1994 was selected as the starting 
point because insufficient earlier data were available. The sample is drawn from the top 500 
companies by market capitalisation. After eliminating companies that are foreign-domiciled or 
unit trusts, or with incomplete data, the final sample comprises 411 unique companies, 
representing a total of 2112 observations of companies reporting abnormal items in their 
annual financial reports over the seven years from 1994 to 2000. Financial data were 
extracted from the ASX FinData database and company financial reports on the Connect 4 
database.11 
 
 
Did the frequency of reported abnormal items increase? 
Houghton (1994) found that in the two years immediately after the changed definition of 
extraordinary items in 1989, the number of abnormal items reported by the top 100 Australian 
companies doubled. He also observed that concurrently with the decline in frequency of 
reported extraordinary items, the frequency of the top 100 companies reporting abnormal 
items increased.  We examine whether there is evidence of an increase in frequency of 
reported abnormal items by the top 500 companies over an extended period after the 1989 
change to the accounting standard.  
 
Table 1 summarises the frequency with which companies reported abnormal items over the 
seven years from 1994 to 2000, showing that apart from a peak in 1998 (56.9%), the 
frequency of companies reporting abnormal items followed a relatively stable pattern ranging 
from 50.9% in 1995 to 53.9% in 2000. This preliminary analysis suggests that the frequency 
of reporting abnormal items by the sample of top 500 companies did not vary significantly 
over the seven years leading up to the removal of the abnormal classification from the 
accounting standard.  
 
 
[TABLES 1, 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
To further explore whether this relatively steady pattern holds for both abnormal income and 
expenses, we split the sample between companies reporting net abnormal losses and those 
reporting net abnormal gains.12 The frequencies shown in Table 2 indicate that while the 
overall percentage of companies reporting abnormal items remained relatively constant over 
the seven-year period, the proportion of companies reporting abnormal losses is clearly 
higher than those reporting abnormal gains in each year of the study period.  
 
Table 2 shows that over the seven-year study period, almost two-thirds of the observations 
were abnormal losses. However, in 1994, only 56% of reported abnormal items were losses 
and this percentage increased to peak at 71% in 1998, then declined to 67% in 1999 and 
62% in 2000. The increased incidence of abnormal losses suggests that companies may 
have been increasingly classifying large expense items as abnormal to shift them out of 
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“normal” earnings. The slight decline in the frequency of abnormal items and the proportion of 
abnormal losses after 1998 may be attributable to the increased attention of regulators and 
the media to perceived abuses of “abnormal” classifications. Companies may have also 
responded to the impending removal of the “abnormal” classification from the accounting 
standard, as signalled by ED 93.  
 
 
Did the magnitude of reported abnormal items change? 
To explore whether there was a change in the magnitude of reported abnormal items, 
descriptive statistics for the value of abnormal items reported each year are presented in 
Table 3, Panel A, showing that in all years, abnormal items were, on average, a loss. The 
median (negative) value of abnormal items remained relatively constant between 1994 and 
1996, more than doubled in 1997 and almost doubled again in 1998, before declining in 1999 
and then sharply increasing again in 2000.   
 
To further explore these changes in the magnitude of abnormal items, the sample companies 
are split between those reporting abnormal losses and those reporting abnormal gains. The 
median values for each are presented in Panels B and C of Table 3 showing that over the 
seven-year period, the median values of abnormal gains changed only by relatively small 
amounts, and in each year were either slightly above or slightly below $2 million. In contrast, 
abnormal losses (Panel C) show a significant increase over the seven years. The median 
abnormal loss ranges from a low of $2,029,000 in 1996 to a high of $5,076,000 in 2000, with 
abnormal losses reported in the years after 1996 around double those reported in previous 
years. The absolute magnitudes of the median abnormal losses are also about twice the 
magnitudes of abnormal gains reported in each of the post-1996 years. Thus, not only did the 
absolute magnitude of abnormal losses exceed that of abnormal gains in each year, the 
magnitude of abnormal losses jumped significantly in 1997 and remained around double that 
of abnormal gains in each of the following years. 
 
While these results suggest that the magnitude of abnormal losses reported by the sample 
companies increased significantly over the study period, they may merely be in line with 
concurrent magnitudes of company profits. Further analysis is conducted to examine the 
materiality of abnormal items relative to profit before abnormal items. Table 4, Panel A, shows 
that there is an even more marked increase in the median magnitude of reported abnormal 
items relative to earnings before abnormal items, with the median value of abnormal items a 
relatively small negative 2.2% of profit in 1994, rising to a peak of negative 18% in 1998, and 
declining slightly to a negative 14.7% in 2000.  
 
The pattern of median abnormal gains over the seven-year period (Panel B of Table 4) shows 
fluctuations between a low of 11.9% and a high of 33.5%. In contrast, the pattern for 
abnormal losses (Panel C of Table 4) shows the median proportion of abnormal losses 
relative to earnings before abnormal items was steady at around 20% for the first three years, 
jumped to about 36% in 1997 and 1998 and increased to 46.2% in 1999 and 54.5% in 2000. 
Interestingly, while the proportions of abnormal losses were at their highest in 1999 and 2000, 
the proportions of abnormal gains for those years were around their lowest. These results 
confirm that over the two years before the changes to the accounting standard an increasing 
proportion of companies were reporting increasingly large amounts of abnormal losses, 
whereas a smaller proportion of companies were reporting relatively small amounts of 
abnormal gains.    
 
 
 [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
Our analysis shows that both the proportional frequency of reported abnormal losses and 
magnitude of those abnormal losses increased significantly between 1994 and 2000. In 
particular, the significant increase in the magnitude of abnormal losses relative to pre-
abnormals profit after 1996 suggests that some companies may have opportunistically 
classified large expense items as abnormal to boost their reported normal earnings number. 
Our findings also provide evidence of asymmetry in the reporting of abnormal items. 
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Consistent with Houghton’s (1994) finding of a shift in the nature of reported abnormal items, 
we show that abnormal items for each year from 1994 to 2000 are, on average, losses. Not 
only does the frequency of abnormal losses exceed abnormal gains, the absolute magnitudes 
of abnormal losses exceed abnormal gains for each year, and the relative proportions of 
abnormal losses to profit before abnormal items exceed the relative proportions of abnormal 
gains for all years except 1994.  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study finds that over the period 1994 to 2000, the median values of reported abnormal 
items were losses. While the overall frequency of abnormal items did not change markedly, 
the median dollar (loss) amount of abnormal items increased significantly after 1996. 
Moreover, our analysis reveals that both the frequency and relative magnitude of reported 
abnormal losses increased significantly during this period, whereas the frequencies of items 
reported as abnormal gains remained relatively constant and the relative magnitude 
fluctuated over this period. The relative magnitude of abnormal losses was a little higher than 
abnormal gains in 1997 and 1998, but then a dramatic change occurred in 1999 with the 
relative magnitude of abnormal losses increasing to more than three times the amount of 
abnormal gains, and then further increasing to more than four times in 2000 (Table 4, Panels 
B and C). Thus, our analysis reveals asymmetry in both the frequency and amount of 
abnormal items reported in the four years leading up to the removal of the abnormal 
classification from the accounting standard.  
 
Our findings suggest that companies may have opportunistically classified loss items as 
abnormal and consequently, on average, reported improved normal earnings. On face value, 
it appears the standard-setters were justified in removing the abnormal classification from the 
accounting standard. However, if companies were classifying items as abnormal to signal the 
transitory nature of these items, then the change diminishes their ability to communicate 
information about the nature of reported gains and losses. A relatively large proportion of 
Cameron and Gallery’s (1998) sample of companies (37%) voluntarily disclosed earnings per 
share before abnormal items,13 suggesting Australia’s largest companies considered that 
reporting earnings before abnormal items was relevant to users. If the abnormal classification 
was used to signal the transitory nature of the items, removing this classification may have an 
adverse impact on the usefulness of reported earnings information. By simply requiring 
companies to separately disclose material items, without indicating the nature of such items 
(ie, whether they are outside the normal operations of the company) may reduce the utility of 
the disclosures to users.  
 
Further, in view of the discussions by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
and the US Financial Accounting Board (FASB) in their joint project on the presentation of 
information on the face of financial statements, the results of this study should be of interest 
to the academic and professional communities alike. The question of whether managers used 
abnormal items to signal useful information or, alternatively, whether they were simply 
attempting to manipulate market participants’ perceptions about the company’s earnings, 
highlights a need for further research of these issues.   
 
 
Robyn Cameron is at Griffith University and Professor Natalie Gallery is at the Queensland 
University of Technology. The authors appreciate the comments and suggestions of two 
anonymous referees. Funding for data collection was provided in part by a CPA Research 
Grant awarded to Robyn Cameron for another project which investigates the relationship 
between abnormal items and financial analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
 
 
 
 8
NOTES 
 
 
1 Revsine et al (2005, p. 55) define special items as “material events that arise from a firm’s 
ongoing, continuing activities but that are either unusual in nature or infrequent in 
occurrence”.  
 
2 AAS 1 was originally known as DS 1.2 (Institute)/301 (Society), issued in December 1973. 
 
3 The ASRB series of accounting standards was replaced by the AASB accounting standards 
series.  
 
4 Similar definitions are contained in the US pronouncement APB No. 30 Reporting the 
Results of Operations and in the UK standard FRS 3 Reporting Financial Performance.  
 
5 Classifying P&L items as extraordinary was eventually eliminated with the adoption in 2005 
of AASB 101 Presentation of Financial Statements, which specifically prohibits such 
classification (para. 84).   
 
6 International Accounting Standard IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statements. 
 
7 The disclosure requirements in AASB 1018 were subsequently superseded by AASB 101, 
effective 1 January 2005. AASB 101 is similar to AASB 1018 in its requirement to separately 
disclose material items; AASB 101, para. 86, states: “When items of income and expense are 
material, their nature and amount shall be disclosed separately.”   
 
8 Media reports continued to refer to profits before abnormal items for some time after the 
accounting standard change — for example, in respect of a report on the 2004 Qantas profit, 
“respected analyst Jason Smith said the upgraded pre-abnormal profit, 39 per cent ahead of 
last year . . .” (Creedy 2004, p. 27); and again with “ . . . Rio Tinto, which made a profit before 
abnormal items last year of $2.4 billion.” (Bachelard 2003, p. 21). 
9 In its 2001 annual report the National Bank of Australia (NAB) in its financial review (p. 32) 
reported “cash earnings before significant items” and “earnings per share before significant 
items”. In both instances the result before significant items was reported on first, then results 
after significant items were reported. In essence, results before significant items are given 
more prominence than earnings after significant items. In its 2002 financial review summary 
(p. 15) the NAB report both net profit and cash net profit before significant items with the total 
for these two performance measures being displayed in bold type. The NAB 2004 annual 
report again reports a number of performance measures on a pre-significant items basis (p. 
15). NAB had no significant items to report in the 2003 financial year.  
 
10 See examples in notes 8 and 9.  
 
11 All abnormal items data were hand-collected from company financial reports due to errors 
found in the ASX FinData database.  
 
12 Abnormal items are measured as the net aggregate of reported abnormal items. 
Companies could report multiple occurrences of either or both abnormal gains and abnormal 
losses. Thus, if a company reported a larger amount of abnormal losses compared to 
abnormal gains, then the company would have reported a net abnormal loss, and vice versa 
with respect to abnormal gains.  
 
13 The operative AASB 1027 Earnings per Share required the inclusion of abnormal items in 
the earnings amount that is used to calculate the earnings per share ratio.   
 
14 The author’s name is misspelt in the by-line of the published article: it should be Houghton, 
not Horton. In this paper we cite the publication using the author’s correctly spelled name 
(Houghton).  
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TABLE 1: FREQUENCY OF SAMPLE TOP-500 COMPANIES REPORTING 
ABNORMAL ITEMS FROM 1994 TO 2000 
Year Companies reporting 
abnormal items 
Companies with no 
abnormal items 
Total  
 N % N % N 
1994 131 52.0 121 48.0 252 
1995 141 50.9 136 49.1 277 
1996 165 51.2 157 48.8 322 
1997 178 53.8 153 46.2 331 
1998 206 56.9 156 43.1 362 
1999 163 52.6 147 47.4 310 
2000 139 53.9 119 46.1 258 
TOTAL 1123 53.2% 989 46.8 2112 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: FREQUENCY OF REPORTED ABNORMAL LOSSES AND 
ABNORMAL GAINS  
Year Abnormal losses Abnormal gains Total  
 N % N % N 
1994 73 56 58 44 131 
1995 88 62 53 38 141 
1996 102 62 63 38 165 
1997 114 64 64 36 178 
1998 146 71 60 29 206 
1999 110 67 53 33 163 
2000 86 62 53 38 139 
TOTAL 719 
 
64 404 
 
36 1123 
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TABLE 3: VALUE OF ABNORMAL ITEMS REPORTED BY SAMPLE 
COMPANIES 
Year N Mean 
$000 
Median 
$000 
Minimum 
$000 
Maximum 
$000 
Panel A: All companies  
1994 131 -4,839 -334 -376,400 107,000 
1995 141 -17,078 -357 -540,600 133,900 
1996 165 -8,647 -367 -286,537 130,900 
1997 178 -25,984 -858 -976,000 68,700 
1998 206 -12,401 -1,511 -415,100 285,814 
1999 163 -28,174 -803 -3,323,353* 372,576 
2000 139 -13,595 -1,257 -478,700 201,000 
All years 1123
 
-16,145 -705 -3,323,353 372,576 
Panel B: Companies reporting abnormal gains  
1994 58 11,673 2,246 70 107,000 
1995 53 8,401 1,886 >0 & <1 133,900 
1996 63 7,539 1,775 20 130,900 
1997 64 8,159 2,227 22 68,700 
1998 60 18,901 2,317 37 285,814 
1999 53 13,573 2,416 30 372,576 
2000 53 11,323 2,126 >0 & <1 201,000 
All years 
 
404 11,343 2,140 >0 & <1 372,576 
Panel C: Companies reporting abnormal losses  
1994 73 -17,958 -2,652 -376,400 -35 
1995 88 -32,423 -2,770 -540,600 -13 
1996 102 -18,645 -2,029 -296,537 <0 & >-1 
1997 114 -45,152 -4,043 -976,000 -140 
1998 146 -25,264 -4,328 -415,100 -42 
1999 110 -48,375 -4,112 -3,323,353 -1 
2000 86 -28,951 -5,076 -478,700 -14 
All years 
 
719 -31,590 -3,747 -3,323,353 <0 & >-1 
 * Relates to the 1999 assets writedown by BHP. 
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Table 4: Abnormal items as a proportion of earnings before abnormal items  
 
Year N Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: All companies  
1994 131 -0.992 -0.022 -73.998 33.709 
1995 141 -1.065 -0.067 -46.960 4.139 
1996 165 -0.619 -0.063 -61.258 24.913 
1997 178 -4.000 -0.085 -311.667 39.444 
1998 206 -1.557 -0.180 -56.604 31.565 
1999 163 -1.183 -0.158 -39.762 27.163 
2000 139 -6.959 -0.147 -565.856 3.784 
All years 1123
 
-2.293 -0.095 -565.856 39.444 
Panel B: Companies reporting abnormal gains  
1994 58 1.462 0.335 0.003 33.709 
1995 53 0.541 0.119 0.002 4.139 
1996 63 1.191 0.136 0.001 24.913 
1997 64 1.231 0.300 0.001 39.444 
1998 60 1.517 0.262 0.002 31.565 
1999 53 1.738 0.135 0.002 27.163 
2000 53 0.352 0.134 0.001 3.784 
All years 
 
404 1.161 0.218 0.001 39.444 
Panel C: Companies reporting abnormal losses  
1994 73 -2.942 -0.194 -73.998 -0.004 
1995 88 -2.032 -0.210 -46.960 -0.009 
1996 102 -1.736 -0.215 -61.258 -0.005 
1997 114 -6.937 -0.363 -311.667 -0.009 
1998 146 -2.820 -0.358 -56.604 -0.003 
1999 110 -2.590 -0.462 -39.762 -0.001 
2000 86 -11.465 -0.545 -565.856 -0.013 
All years 
 
719 -4.234 -0.340 -565.856 -0.001 
 
 
 
